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The Tarasoff Rule: The Implications of
Interstate Variation and Gaps in
Professional Training
Rebecca Johnson, MA, Govind Persad, JD, and Dominic Sisti, PhD
Recent events have revived questions about the circumstances that ought to trigger therapists’ duty to warn or
protect. There is extensive interstate variation in duty to warn or protect statutes enacted and rulings made in the
wake of the California Tarasoff ruling. These duties may be codified in legislative statutes, established in common
law through court rulings, or remain unspecified. Furthermore, the duty to warn or protect is not only variable
between states but also has been dynamic across time. In this article, we review the implications of this variability
and dynamism, focusing on three sets of questions: first, what legal and ethics-related challenges do therapists in
each of the three broad categories of states (states that mandate therapists to warn or protect, states that permit
therapists to breach confidentiality for warnings but have no mandate, and states that give no guidance) face in
handling threats of violence? Second, what training do therapists and other professionals involved in handling
violent threats receive, and is this training adequate for the task that these professionals are charged with? Third,
how have recent court cases changed the scope of the duty? We conclude by pointing to gaps in the empirical and
conceptual scholarship surrounding the duty to warn or protect.
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Recent cases of violence committed by persons who
have received psychiatric treatment have revived im-
portant questions about therapist–client confidenti-
ality and the circumstances in which that confiden-
tiality can or must be broken.1 More specifically,
what is the status of training and clinicians’ knowl-
edge about their responsibilities when a patient com-
municates a threat of imminent violence? These
questions stem from the Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California rulings2,3 issued in the 1970s.
Prosenjit Poddar, a graduate student at the Univer-
sity of California (UC) Berkeley, told his therapist
that he wanted to obtain a gun and kill the object of
his infatuation, Tatiana Tarasoff. The therapist in-
formed the campus police about the threat but nei-
ther the police nor the therapist warned Tarasoff di-
rectly. Poddar then murdered Tarasoff when she
returned to campus from summer vacation, an event
that occurred two months after Poddar broke off
contact with his therapist.
Tarasoff’s parents sued the campus police and the
UCRegents for failing to warn their daughter, and in
Tarasoff I,2 the California Supreme Court stated that
therapists have a duty to warn others who are in
foreseeable danger from the therapists’ patients. The
duty to warn enunciated in the first ruling was ex-
panded in an opinion issued after a rehearing of the
case, Tarasoff II,3 wherein the court stated that the
therapist has a duty to “use reasonable care to protect
the intended victim against such danger.”4 In the
hands of the California court, the duty to warn a
potential victim evolved into a duty to protect, a
more expansive obligation that may include warning
the potential victim, telling the police, and taking
“whatever steps are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances.” In the three decades since the Tara-
soff rulings, the duties to warn and protect have been
applied, refined, and revised in many states’ case law
and statutes, including those of the state of California
itself.
In this review, we raise and examine three sets of
questions about Tarasoff duties, all aimed at stimu-
lating more empirical, legal, and conceptual scholar-
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ship on these neglected topics. First, what key ethics-
related and legal questions does substantial interstate
variation in duties to warn or protect raise? What
ethics principles should guide therapists in states
with legal leeway in how to discharge the duty as they
handle potential threats? Second, to what extent do
mental health professionals understand the details of
their given state’s codification (or lack thereof) of
Tarasoff-type duties, and to what extent are other
relevant professionals (law enforcement officers, uni-
versity officials, and lawyers involved in risk mitiga-
tion) aware of how to assist therapists in discharging
their duty? Finally, how do courts typically rule in
cases surrounding the duty to warn or protect, and
what reasoning do courts use? We conclude with a
brief discussion of gaps in existing conceptual and
empirical work in each of these three areas.
The Policy and Legal Landscape
There is no blanket federal duty to warn or pro-
tect; instead, there is substantial state-by-state varia-
tion in whether and how the duties are defined and
codified. Each state falls into one of four general
categories, elucidated in a 2012 review by Griffin
Edwards of state statutes and case law (Table 1):
1) A duty to warn or protect is mandated and codified in a
legislative statute (23 states);
2) a duty to warn or protect is not codified in a statute but
is present in the common law supported by precedent (10
states);
3) a duty to warn or protect is neither codified in statute nor
present in state case law, but states permit a breach of con-
fidentiality in the therapeutic relationship if a threat is pres-
ent (11 states);
4) there are neither statutes nor case law offering guidance
on the issue. (6 states) [Ref. 5].
Other surveys of state statutes have given slightly
different breakdowns of states that fall into each cat-
egory owing to different methodologies that have
been used for classifying states. For instance, in a
2002 review, Herbert et al.6 classified 27 states as
having a mandatory duty to warn in statute or com-
mon law (compared with Edwards’ 33 states), 9
states as having a permissive duty (as opposed to Ed-
wards’ 11 states), and 13 states as having no statutes
or case law offering guidance (as opposed to Ed-
wards’ 6 states). These discrepancies stem from dif-
ferent standards for when a state has proposed a duty
through common law: Edwards’ survey suggested
that if a court states that it is prepared to rule in favor
of Tarasoff, should the appropriate fact pattern be
present, a state (e.g., Alabama and Georgia) has es-
tablished a common law duty, whereas Herbert et al.
classified these states as offering no legal guidance.
This discrepancy in survey findings highlights the
complexity created by interstate variation, a com-
plexity that has been reviewed extensively else-
where.5,7,8 We therefore ask, what are the legal and
ethics-related implications of such significant be-
tween-state variation in the duty to protect or warn?
In addressing this question, we can distinguish
between three general categories of states: those that
mandate some duty to warn or protect (and that
often specify whether law enforcement, the victim, or
a combination should be “warned”); those that allow
therapists to warn by protecting them from liability
for breach of confidentiality if they do so, but do not
require them to issue a warning; and those that offer
no statutory or case law guidance. We highlight the
ethics-based and legal implications of this variation
for health professionals.
Table 1 Variations in State Policies Related to the Duty to Warn or Protect
Category States
States with mandatory duty to warn or protect
Codified in statute Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia, and Washington
Indicated in common law Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin
States that permit breach of confidentiality in
cases of threat*
Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming
States with no statute/common law guidance Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico, and North Dakota
Created by the authors with data from Edwards5 and updated with the FindLaw database at www.findlaw.com.
* States that permit a breach of confidentiality are distinct from those that mandate confidentiality be broken. Permissive states reject Tarasoff
and do not place a legal obligation on therapists to issue a warning.
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Discharging the Duty in States with Mandatory
Statutes
Clinicians in states with statutes or case law that
mandate a duty to warn or protect face at least one
source of ambiguity: the risk assessment required to
determine whether a patient’s threat level is high
enough to require the therapist to discharge the duty.
In assessing this risk level, clinicians should be aware
of state requirements that affect how this threshold is
set: whether the victim must be identifiable (most
states); whether the threat must be imminent (most
states); or whether the threat need not be imminent
but must be serious (few states). In addition, even for
states that explicitly state that the violence must be
“imminent” to impose the duty to warn upon the
therapist, clinical commentators often specify differ-
ent definitions of how the law ought to interpret
imminent, ranging from a few days to a few weeks to
several months, with state case law also using differ-
ent notions of what counts as imminent.9 Further-
more, the definition of imminence that is relevant for
duty-to-warn cases, where a therapist breaches con-
fidentiality as a result of a threat of imminent vio-
lence, may and often does differ from the definition
of imminence that is relevant in cases such as civil
commitment, where a therapist deprives a patient of
liberty as a result of imminent danger to the patient
or others.9 This source of confusion has led commen-
tators to recommend that clinicians focus less on the
imminence of the threat in Tarasoff cases and more
on the patient’s demonstrated capacity to carry out
the threat (i.e., whether the patient has a history of
violence, whether the patient has experienced situa-
tional triggers that have exacerbated violence in the
past, and what can be done to intervene).9,10
Once a clinician has decided that a patient poses a
threat of violence sufficient to trigger a duty, the
limited empirical data that are available on how cli-
nicians actually discharge this duty suggest thatmany
may take liberties with their states’ specific legal guid-
ance. For example, although California state law
mandates that clinicians warn potential victims and a
law enforcement agency of serious threats of physical
violence,11,12 data from San Francisco suggest that
many therapists use involuntary civil commitment
for patients who pose a threat.13 This approach may
be legally valid if the patient meets the criteria for
civil commitment and the therapist determines that
the patient no longer poses a threat of imminent
violence after the commitment period. Perhaps these
therapists pursue commitment because they see it as a
more effective means of reducing a patient’s risk than
warning a potential victim. Further research should dis-
entangle therapists’ reasons for pursuing a given course
of action in states with mandatory statutes to ensure
that therapists do not use warnings and civil commit-
ment as substitutes where inappropriate.
Discharging the Duty in States With Common
Law Suggesting Mandatory Duty
In states where a mandatory duty to warn or pro-
tect has arisen exclusively from the judiciary, clini-
cians’ understanding of their specific state’s regula-
tions may be compromised. Arguably, case law is
more dynamic than legislative statutes elucidating
duties, some of which have remained unchanged
over the past 20 years, and the changes in case law
may be difficult to interpret, not well publicized, and
generally nontransparent. Thus, although clinicians
may have heard of Tarasoff and think that they un-
derstand its broad implications, case law in their state
may offer guidance that differs significantly from the
broad implications of the initial Tarasoff case. For
instance, after Virginia rejected Tarasoff duties in
Nasser v. Parker and before it passed a mandatory
Tarasoff statute in 2010, it nonetheless found that
allegations that providers had taken responsibility for
a psychiatric patient raised questions of fact for a
trial, opening up providers to the expense and time of
litigation.14 If the case law in a given state is not clear
and well publicized, therapists in these states face an
additional source of ambiguity in deciding how to
handle a violent threat.
Discharging the Duty in States with Permissive
Statutes
Therapists in the second category of states, those
with permissive statutes that protect therapists from
liability for breach of confidentiality in the case of
threats but do not obligate them by statute to warn or
protect the potential victim, arguably face more dif-
ficulty in determining how to protect potential vic-
tims than do therapists in states with mandatory stat-
utes and case law. Therapists in states with permissive
statutes have several legally acceptable options when
a patient makes a violent threat against an identifi-
able victim: continue therapy as planned without is-
suing any warning, change the therapy to contain the
threat and protect the potential victim, warn the vic-
tim, warn law enforcement, warn the victim and law
enforcement, or determine if there are grounds for
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civil commitment based on the patient’s dangerous-
ness to others.
The first two strategies, where the therapist does
not issue a warning, may be more legally risky than
the other strategies, since permissive statutes protect
a therapist only when he breaches confidentiality and
do not necessarily protect a therapist in the following
situation: when he does not breach confidentiality,
when there are strong reasons for such a breach, and
when a victim is hurt. For instance, in Almonte v.
New York Medical College,15 a federal district court
ruled that a physician training a psychiatric resident
studying child psychiatry could have a common law
duty to future patients of the resident to warn that
the resident had pedophilia, even though Connecti-
cut (whose state law applied) is a permissive-statute
state, and so the psychiatrist was not violating a stat-
utory duty.
Although immediately notifying law enforcement
and potential victims of a threat may be the safest
course of action legally, there are moral reasons sup-
porting other strategies in permissive states. Most
simply, the duty to protect is grounded in the moral
right of the potential, identifiable victim to avoid
preventable death or substantial, debilitating physi-
cal injury. The potential victim has a moral claim
against the clinician who, by virtue of his relationship
with the patient and his knowledge of the patient’s
violent intentions, is in a position to try to prevent
this serious harm from occurring. Therefore, the
moral duty to protect involves a goal for the clinician,
to protect the victim, while minimizing the extent to
which various interests of the patient are set back in
pursuit of this goal, including liberty interests and
some degree of privacy in clinical communication.
This moral basis serves as the foundation for legal
duties to protect, which specify cases where legal re-
quirements of clinician–patient confidentiality are
removed to allow a clinician to try to avert harm to an
identifiable victim.
We argue that a clinician can best show respect for
patient rights while protecting potential victims by
first alerting a patient that he is considering a notifi-
cation and discussing whether the statements or ges-
tures indicating violent intent were made sincerely.
For instance, a patient may express a violent fantasy
in a moment of anger, and the therapist might ex-
plore the extent to which the patient plans to act on
the fantasy and whether he has the means to do so.
The law bolsters this approach to assessing the sin-
cerity of violent fantasies by generally holding that a
patient’s violent fantasies do not necessarily impose a
duty to warn upon the therapist, unless the patient
has a history of violence or other risk factors.10 The
therapist should then indicate that if the threat is
sincere, he will notify the authorities and the poten-
tial victim. These steps should be combined with the
continuation of intensive counseling.
Data support this strategy of working collabora-
tively with a patient: therapists who talk with pa-
tients first about the need to report a threat, as op-
posed to unilaterally notifying law enforcement and a
potential victim with no disclosure to the patient,
report that the warning either had a positive or no
impact on the therapeutic relationship. Warnings
that were not discussed beforehand had negative
ramifications for this relationship.16 Therefore, re-
specting patients through disclosure about possible
warnings and discussion about the threat has both
intrinsic value in supporting patient interests and
instrumental value in minimizing damage to the
therapeutic relationship. In turn, an intact therapeu-
tic relationship may better alleviate a patient’s future
violent intentions than a damaged relationship or
one where the patient breaks off all contact. Of
course, there may be contexts in which it is difficult
or impossible to discuss the warning with the patient
(for example, if the therapist decides that the threat
warrants a warning after the end of a therapeutic
session and the patient has broken off all contact) but
in general, therapists should attempt discussion to
show respect to the patient and his trust in the
therapist.
Discharging the Duty in States With No
Statutory or Common Law Guidance
Therapists in the third category of states (those
without any statutory or common law guidance) face
a more fraught set of options than therapists in states
with either a mandatory or permissive duty, since
therapists in this third category have neither an es-
tablished affirmative duty to warn or protect nor a
legally established justification to breach confidenti-
ality in exercising such a warning. As a result, thera-
pists in these states are open to significant legal risk
nomatter how they proceed: if they breach confiden-
tiality, a patient could sue, and if they fail to breach
confidentiality and a victim is harmed, the victim
could sue. That legal risk could be reduced by the
passage of legislation, exemplified by the American
Tarasoff Rule
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Psychiatric Association’s (APA)Model Statute or an-
other state’s statute that clarifies therapists’ duties
regarding potentially violent patients.
Variations Within a State in Interpreting the
Duty to Warn or Protect
We have noted that the passage of a statute clari-
fying a therapist’s duty to warn or protect reduces the
legal risk a therapist faces, but the existence of a stat-
ute by no means eliminates this risk, because of in-
trastate conflicts and inconsistencies between stat-
utes and judicial rulings, which highlight that a
therapist’s risk is by no means eliminated by the ex-
istence of a statute. A few examples: the Arizona Su-
preme Court found that Arizona’s Tarasoff statute
did not shield therapists from exposure to civil dam-
ages because such a limitation would violate the Ar-
izona Constitution.17 The Utah Supreme Court ex-
tended therapists’ duties beyond what Utah’s
original Tarasoff statute prescribed, holding them li-
able in cases where they should know of a threat as
well as in cases where they have actual knowledge.18
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that
NewHampshire’sTarasoff statute does not pre-empt
common law duties to warn, and so medical profes-
sionals can be subjected to common-law tort claims,
even if they do what the Tarasoff statute mandates.19
Courts in several states have issued verdicts seemingly
in tension with Tarasoff statutes without citing or
distinguishing the statutes.20,21
Variations in the Purpose of Invoking the Duty
to Warn or Protect
In addition to interstate and intrastate variation in
the duty to warn or protect, therapists also face vari-
ability in the purpose for which a state’s case law
and/or statute will be invoked in legal cases. A vic-
tim’s family may prosecute a therapist for failing to
discharge the duty appropriately, or a therapist may
use duty to warn or protect statutes as a legal shield if
prosecuted for a breach of confidentiality by a client
whom the therapist reported. In other words, the
statutes can be a liability if a therapist inappropriately
does nothing and a client commits a violent act, or
the statutes can be a form of protection if a therapist
appropriately does something and a client sues for
breach of confidentiality. The diversity of uses of
these statutes highlights why therapists and other
covered mental health professionals should have a
nuanced understanding of their state’s regulation or
case law. The next section reviews whether therapists
and allied health and legal professionals achieve this
level of understanding.
Who Knows What?
Research conducted in the first 20 years after the
Tarasoff ruling found that although many therapists
were aware of the case, there was substantial misin-
formation regarding the extent of a given state’s law
and whether it required therapists merely to warn
authorities about a potentially harmful patient or in-
stead to take steps to protect the potential victim.22
However, the past decade’s increase in mandated
ethics and forensic education as part of graduate
training or continuing education requirements may
make these early studies of therapist misinformation
outdated and inaccurate.
Training for Psychologists and Psychiatrists
Tarasoff-related training is given to clinical psychol-
ogists and psychiatrists in both formal and informal
settings, with formal training related to the duties likely
to fall under the heading of ethics or forensic education.
For psychologists, the American Psychological Associa-
tion requires training in ethics as a part of accredited
PhD programs, and their most recent survey of con-
tinuing education standards found that 26 states require
between 1.5 and 6 hours of training in ethics annually
for licensure maintenance.23,24
While future psychiatrists are in medical school,
they receive substantial training in ethics. A 2008
survey found that the average medical school re-
quired 35.6 hours of bioethics instruction, yet this
training may be nonspecific to the situations that
mental health professionals face.25 Once they choose
the specialty of psychiatry, psychiatrists receive train-
ing in Tarasoff-related duties from two sources dur-
ing residency: formal training and response to infor-
mal, on-the-job events. For formal training, one
survey of training content in psychiatric residency
found that more than 88 percent of programs taught
about the duty to warn, withmore than 10 percent of
programs not responding and only 0.7 percent say-
ing that they did not teach about the duty.26 This
formal training is supplemented by informal, on-the-
job situations that prompt the resident to discharge a
duty to warn or protect. One survey of second-
through fourth-year residents in psychiatry found
that 22 of the 46 residents surveyed had issued a
Tarasoffwarning at some point during their training.27
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Therefore, for both clinical psychologists and psy-
chiatrists, topics related to the duty to warn or pro-
tect appear to be well covered through both formal
education and hands-on experiences. However,
questions remain about the prevalence and depth of
education about a crucial step in the process of po-
tentially discharging a duty to warn or protect: risk
assessment to determine the threat level of the pa-
tient. A 1997 survey of psychiatric residents found
that a third received no training in assessing and
managing a patient’s risk of violence and another
third described their training as inadequate28; a 1990
survey of psychologists reported a mean of 3.3 hours
and a median of 0 hours of formal training in risk
assessment.29 Although training in risk assessment
may have increased in quantity since the time of these
surveys and although some argue that actuarial tools
for violence risk assessment such as the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide (VRAG) are more accurate predic-
tors of violence than unstructured clinical judg-
ment,30 clinicians still need training on how to trans-
late scores on the measures into complex decisions in
the clinical setting.31 The education of mental health
professionals in Tarasoff-related duties not only
should outline the scope of these duties but should
also teach practical risk assessment and management
techniques that clinicians need for appropriate as-
sessment and handling of a threat. For instance, ther-
apists should learn to make a distinction between a
patient who makes a threat by communicating an
intent to harm versus one who poses a threat (i.e., has
planning and building capacity for a violent act).32
Training should emphasize that, although the law
focuses on therapists issuing warnings after violent
communication, a therapist’s ethics-related obliga-
tions should extend to patients who pose a legitimate
threat to identifiable others.
Psychologists’ Knowledge of the Duty
Unfortunately, simply quantifying the amount of
formal and hands-on training related toTarasoffmay
offer too rosy a picture of the extent to which psychi-
atrists and psychologists understand the duties man-
dated or permitted by their specific states. In one
study, Pabian et al.,33 found that 63 percent of the
psychologists surveyed had completed a graduate
course in ethics, and 87 percent of those had received
instructions on the Tarasoff ruling and their respon-
sibilities for dangerous patients. Most clinicians ap-
peared confident that this training adequately in-
formed them about their duties, with only 10 percent
expressing uncertainty about their legal duties sur-
rounding potentially violent patients.
However, despite such confidence, 76 percent of
the psychologists surveyed were incorrect in selecting
the statement that best described their given state’s
duty-to-protect law. The errors stemmed from amis-
understanding of the circumstances that trigger a
duty to protect, with many therapists incorrectly
thinking that the duty extends beyond the bounds of
imminent danger in their state and a misunderstand-
ing of the level of threat that triggers a duty to pro-
tect, with 41 percent of therapists incorrectly believ-
ing that they should warn the victim and law
enforcement when the likelihood that patient will
follow through on the threat appeared low or uncer-
tain.33 Perhaps owing to this inflated understanding
of the circumstances and threat level that trigger a
duty to protect, the therapists reported experiencing
a scenario requiring duty to warn or protect fairly
frequently, approximately once every two years. The
results of this survey suggest that although psycholo-
gists are aware of Tarasoff and receive graduate ethics
training, many are confused or misinformed about
the specifics of their states’ statutes and common law
on the duty to warn or protect. The gap in knowledge
that is understandable, given the complexity of the
regulations, but nevertheless is a gap that training
and continuing education programs should work to
remedy.
Other Health Professionals’ Knowledge of the
Duty
The analysis by Pabian et al.33 was limited to psy-
chologists, most of whom practiced in outpatient
settings. It does not include psychiatrists. Further-
more, at least 20 states seem to extend the duty to
physicians who are not necessarily credentialed in
psychiatry as long as the physician purports to offer
mental health treatment (Table 2). We are not aware
of data that assess psychiatrists’ knowledge of their
state’s duty to warn or protect statutes and case law or
the knowledge of nonpsychiatrist physicians, social
workers, nurse practitioners, and other health
professionals.
Further research on allied health professionals’ un-
derstanding of Tarasoff is needed, as behavioral
health care increasingly relies on nonpsychiatrist and
nonpsychologist providers. Health care reform
should catalyze the move toward integrated care in
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which primary care physicians, nurse practitioners,
health counselors, and other nonspecialty providers
may serve as a frequent point of contact for persons
with psychiatric disorders.34 Although some pro-
vider types (e.g., psychologists and psychiatrists) are
covered by Tarasoff-related duties in most states (Ta-
ble 2), other provider types (e.g., nonpsychiatrist
physicians) are covered in only a subset of states.
Health professionals not explicitly covered by their
states’ duty to warn or protect statutes lack clear stat-
utory protection from liability if they breach confi-
dentiality to report aTarasoff-type threat. They are in
a risky situation resembling that of health profession-
als in states that altogether lack duty to warn or pro-
tect statutes.
Other Parties’ Knowledge of the Duty
Research on other potential parties in the equation
(i.e., law enforcement professionals or institutional
legal and risk management offices who may be in-
formed of a patient’s potential dangerousness) is also
scarce. One 1998–1999 survey of Michigan and
North Carolina police officers found that only 3 per-
cent were familiar with the Tarasoff ruling and only
24 percent reported that their stations had specific
policies on when and how to warn potential victims
of a violent patient, despite the fact that 45 percent of
stations had received at least one Tarasoff-related
warning from a mental health professional.35 No
empirical scholarship of which we are aware exam-
ines how the legal and risk management offices of
institutions such as universities or integrated health
care systems advise therapists on how to handle a
Tarasoff-related warning.
The Narrowing of the Duties
Whereas much of the early commentary sur-
rounding Tarasoff consisted of dire proclamations
about the damaging effect the rulings would have on
psychotherapy, with commentators arguing that the
therapeutic relationship would be irremediably com-
promised by the ensuing regulations, recent court
cases illustrate that therapists are very rarely held lia-
ble. Soulier et al.,36 in an analysis of 70 appellate cases
from 1985 to 2006, found that 46 were decided in
favor of the mental health professional, 6 were de-
cided in favor of the plaintiff (although only 4 of
these usedTarasoff statutes), and 17 were returned to
trial courts for further litigation. Mental health pro-
fessionals were exonerated on the following bases: no
imminent threat was communicated to a therapist
about an identifiable victim; the victim was already
aware of the danger; or the therapist warned the vic-
tim, but the victim took actions that went against the
warning.
Courts appeared to rule in favor of the victims
only in marked cases of negligence by the mental
health professional or institution: in Almonte,15 a
psychiatrist/patient who was being seen by another
psychiatrist admitted his sexual attraction to chil-
dren, but was recommended for a child psychiatry
fellowship where he raped a child. In other cases,
inpatient psychiatric treatment was terminated
Table 2 Variations in the Health Professionals Covered
Professionals Covered States
Mental health provider (does not appear to
include psychiatrists or unclear)
Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania
Mental health provider (includes
psychiatrist, psychologist, clinical social
worker, and sometimes associates of
those professions)
California, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, and
New York
Mental health provider (includes above and
physicians who are not necessarily
accredited in psychiatry)
Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming
Not specified or unclear Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, New Mexico, North Carolina, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin
Physician (does not appear to include other
mental health providers)
New Hampshire
Duty not applicable Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Virginia,
Created by the authors with data from Edwards5 and updated with the FindLaw database, available at www.findlaw.com.
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against medical advice or because the patient’s insur-
ance coverage ran out.36
Ultimately, we conclude that the courts converge
on three themes of the duty to warn or protect: hold
therapists liable only in obvious cases of negligence
that result in harm to a victim; recognize when a state
has a permissive statute, rather than an obligatory
one; and do not hold therapists liable for violence
that occurs well after the termination of therapy.37
We note that these narrow interpretations of thera-
pist liability stand in contrast to earlier rulings that
ignored the language of the statutes and interpreted
broad liability, such as cases in which therapists were
held liable for motor vehicle accidents that occurred
months after termination of therapy.
The data sample of Soulier et al.36 was limited, in
that it included only appellate cases and therefore did
not include verdicts in state trial courts that are not
appealed or cases settled before trial. To try to exam-
ine verdicts from state trial courts, they reviewed re-
cords from an APA-sponsored insurance company
that provides coverage to psychiatrists as defendants
in various legal cases, a review that should have iden-
tified trial verdicts that are not appealed. Their re-
view turned up little evidence of money spent on
helping defend psychiatrists in Tarasoff-type cases.
Cases settled before coming to trial were not cap-
tured by either method, and perhaps therapists ac-
cused of improper discharging of Tarasoff duties are
more likely to settle with the plaintiff rather than go
to court. Yet if one accepts the appellate decisions as
fairly representative of how courts now rule in Tara-
soff-type cases, it seems that in contrast to early cases,
courts now resist the notion that a therapist has a
duty to protect the general public and even appear
increasingly likely to reject the notion that an outpa-
tient therapist’s relationship with the client grants
the therapist sufficient control to warn or protect
potential victims.36,38 Therapists may still encounter
the time and distress of litigation, but it appears that
therapists who choose to defend themselves in court
rather than settle the case are increasingly less likely
to be held liable for a patient’s violence except in
cases of marked negligence.
Conclusion
Interstate variation in the duty to warn or protect
raises normative questions about how this variability
may impede mental health professionals’ knowledge
of their duties. Inadequate knowledge not only ex-
poses therapists to legal risks, but also may impede a
therapist’s ability to fulfill an identifiable victim’s
moral claim to be warned about or protected from
substantial harm.When legal scholars have difficulty
parsing the reasoning behind variousTarasoff-related
rulings, it seems unreasonable to expect mental
health care professionals and law enforcement offi-
cers to discharge these duties correctly without in-
creased guidance and support.
Our review also highlights the need for more em-
pirical, legal, and conceptual scholarship in multiple
areas related to various parties’ understanding of the
duty to warn or protect. First, researchers should
move beyond documenting gaps in knowledge about
state-specific Tarasoff regulations to investigate the
forms of education most helpful for remedying these
gaps. Second, research should examine the motiva-
tions of therapists who practice in states that man-
date notifying law enforcement but choose to take
other measures to reduce the threat of the patient.
Are these therapists unaware of their state’s specific
legal suggestions for discharging the duty, or are they
aware but deliberately choosing to address the threat
through means other than those suggested in the
states, and why? Third, existing empirical research
has focused largely on therapists in states with man-
datory statutes. Future research should examine how
therapists in states with permissive statutes weigh
their various legally acceptable options.
Fourth, researchers should attend to health care’s in-
creasing emphasis on nonspecialist mental health care
by investigating nonpsychiatrist/nonpsychologist
health providers’ understanding of the duties imposed
by certain states. Fifth, research should focus on the
knowledge and training of other parties who are often
practically involved in Tarasoff–related situations: the
police, institutional legal and risk management offices,
university professors, and others. Now that most com-
mentators recognize Tarasoff duties as acceptable as-
pects of therapist–client relationships, these areas of fu-
ture scholarship can examine the nuances of these
duties, how the array of professionals responsible for
performing these duties are trained in essential skills,
and how they discharge the duties in institutional and
integrated care contexts.
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